Spectral goodness of fit for network models

We introduce a new statistic, 'spectral goodness of fit' (SGOF) to measure how well a network model explains the structure of an observed network. SGOF provides an absolute measure of fit, analogous to the standard R-squared in linear regression. Additionally, as it takes advantage of the properties of the spectrum of the graph Laplacian, it is suitable for comparing network models of diverse functional forms, including both fitted statistical models and algorithmic generative models of networks. After introducing, defining, and providing guidance for interpreting SGOF, we illustrate the properties of the statistic with a number of examples and comparisons to existing techniques. We show that such a spectral approach to assessing model fit fills gaps left by earlier methods and can be widely applied

Communication Network Design: Balancing Modularity and Mixing via Optimal Graph Spectra

By leveraging information technologies, organizations now have the ability to design their communication networks and crowdsourcing platforms to pursue various performance goals, but existing research on network design does not account for the specific features of social networks, such as the notion of teams. We fill this gap by demonstrating how desirable aspects of organizational structure can be mapped parsimoniously onto the spectrum of the graph Laplacian allowing the specification of structural objectives and build on recent advances in non-convex programming to optimize them. This design framework is general, but we focus here on the problem of creating graphs that balance high modularity and low mixing time, and show how "liaisons" rather than brokers maximize this objective

Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions

Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by coalitions, and computational tractability. In the search for maximally-strategyproof mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy other desirable properties, we introduce a new metric to quantify the strategyproofness of a mechanism, based on comparing the payoff distribution, given truthful reports, against that of a strategyproof “reference” mechanism that solves a problem relaxation. Focusing on combinatorial exchanges, we demonstrate that the metric is informative about the eventual equilibrium, where simple regret-based metrics are not, and can be used for online selection of an effective mechanism.Engineering and Applied Science

Approximate Strategyproofness

The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behavior by participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design space. But in bridging from theory to practice, it often becomes necessary to relax incentive constraints in order to allow tradeoffs with other desirable properties. This article surveys a number of different options that can be adopted in relaxing incentive constraints, providing a current view of the state-of-the-art.Engineering and Applied Science

A Collaborative Approach to Newspaper Layout

Engineering and Applied Science